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Purpose – This paper explores trade policy measures taken in response to COVID-19 and analyzes in 
detail their extent and nature. We assess their compatibility with WTO Agreements: specifically, 
whether they were necessary and justifiable efforts to protect the security and health of populations 
and ask how this widespread recourse to trade barriers may impact on international business? 
Approach – We analyse an extensive database from the International Trade Centre of trade 
measures taken in response to COVID-19. We differentiate by type of country, nature and coverage 
of measures (imports or exports, type of product). On the basis of existing jurisprudence, we analyse 
whether restrictive measures were likely to be judged legal under WTO rules. 
Findings – We find that, although the majority of trade measures are probably justifiable, there were 
nevertheless many measures whose coverage and/or nature was such that a justification under 
existing WTO exceptions is, at the very least, arguable. Such widespread and intense instigation of 
potentially WTO incompatible measures in such a short period of time undoubtedly undermines the 
global trade rules on which international business has relied for decades.  
Originality – There is little existing analysis of the legality of measures taken under the security 
exceptions and no substantial analyses of the measures taken in response to COVID-19. Furthermore, 
little scholarly attention has been paid to the impacts on international business of the increasing use 
of WTO ‘exceptions’ to justify trade measures to protect national industries and populations. 
 







The COVID-19 outbreak in 2020 put huge pressure on healthcare systems across the world, as they 
struggled with unprecedented demand for Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and ventilators. Public 
outcries at the resulting exposure of essential workers to the virus pushed the issue up the political 
agenda in many countries. The sudden realisation that such products, as well as testing kits and 
pharmaceuticals, had an unrecognised importance for national security led to a series of policy 
interventions, including outright bans on exports. At the same time, fear of food shortages linked to 
the pandemic, led to restrictions on the export of key commodities, like rice and wheat, while concerns 
about importing the virus led some countries to ban some, or even all, imports. By early May 2020, 90 
countries had installed trade restrictions in reaction to COVID-19.1  
These COVID-19 related measures are likely to be contrary to WTO principles (WTO, 2020a), as well as 
World Bank advice to governments on how best to leverage trade policy to address COVID-19 (World 
Bank, 2020). They come against a backdrop of a growing debate on the extent to which trade policy 
interventions to protect ‘national security’ are compatible with international trade law. When the 
Trump administration imposed new tariffs on steel and aluminium in 2018 citing ‘security’ concerns 
under Section 232, they were widely criticised by trade partners and several, including the EU, 
launched legal action in the WTO.2  In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, many of these same 
countries themselves restricted trade in PPE and pharmaceuticals, because of concerns about their 
citizens’ security. Many observers and governments have expressed concern about this ‘creep’ of 
security ‘exceptions’ into trade policy (WTO, 2020b; Evenett, 2020; C.D. Howe, 2020).  
While the impulse to protect the supply of vital products is certainly a natural public policy response, 
the potential long-term implications of such measures for trade policy and, in turn, for Multinational 
Enterprises (MNEs) could be significant. It is therefore critical to assess the extent and legality of 
COVID-19 related trade restrictions and the impact on international business. This paper seeks to 
contribute to this debate by answering three questions:   
- What kind of trade policy measures were taken by governments in response to COVID-19? 
- In view of the information available, to what extent do these measures seem to be in 
conformity with existing international trade rules? 
- Do these interventions represent a shift in the interpretation of the rules which frame global 
trade and, if so, how may that impact international business? 
To answer the first two questions, we leverage an extensive International Trade Centre (ITC) database 
of trade policy measures taken in response to COVID-19.  We analyze in detail the extent and nature 
of these interventions and assess their potential compatibility with existing WTO Agreements. In 
undertaking this analysis, we also seek to shed light on the implications for international business (i.e. 
question 3). In particular, we are interested in the wider issue of the long-term impacts of the 
pandemic on the structure and reach of global value chains (GVCs). There is an extensive literature on 
the important role of the state, and especially trade policy, in framing the context in which GVCs have 
expanded across the world (see Curran et al., 2019 for a recent literature review). We will underline 
the potential long-term impacts of public policy interventions in response to the pandemic on this 
framing and highlight the risks and opportunities which this poses for companies.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We firstly highlight the very particular trade policy 
context into which the COVID-19 crisis falls, where the existing international legal framework has 
 
1 https://www.macmap.org/covid19  
2 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds548_e.htm  
 3 
already been contested. We then draw on literature on international trade law, the international 
political economy of trade, GVCs and international business to highlight the interactions between trade 
policy and the structure of production in the global economy. We underline, in particular, how the 
expansion (and contraction) of global trade has often been predicated on shifts in the trade policy 
context. We will then analyse the measures which governments have taken in response to COVID-19, 
focusing particularly on the legality of new trade restrictions. We then leverage this work to draw some 
conclusions on the long-term impacts of COVID-related trade measures on the institutional context 
faced by international businesses and on their reliance on GVCs. In conclusion, we will highlight the 
shortcomings of our research, as well as the key future research questions which arise from our work.  
COVID-19 interventions in context 
It is important to note that the current public health crisis follows several years of growing anti-
globalization sentiments and increasing protectionism, together with the decline of multilateralism 
enshrined in WTO principles. This has already created major strategic challenges for MNEs (Curran and 
Eckhardt, 2020). The economic impact of the pandemic and the widespread PPE shortages which many 
countries experienced, further undermined the long-held belief that the optimisation of international 
sourcing should be a standard part of MNEs’ operating strategy. Criticism of globalisation, and GVCs 
which underpin it, is nothing new. Researchers and activists have long noted the negative externalities 
of the spread of production to distant locations with widely differing and sometimes dysfunctional 
governance structures (Curran and Eckhardt, 2020; Rodrik, 2018). What is new is that the pandemic 
has forced governments and MNEs to actively consider the risks created by another negative 
externality of globalisation – reduced self-sufficiency - which has sometimes interfered with their 
capacity to protect their populations (Strange, 2020). Observers and policy makers quickly began to 
refer to the need to diversify supplier bases and move away from holding near-zero inventories, 
increasing resilience, but also costs (Hogan, 2020; Javorcik, 2020).  Although others have questioned 
the wisdom of government intervention in the sourcing decisions of private companies (ECIPE, 2020) 
and warned of the negative effects of any retrenchment on developing countries (Borderlex, 2020) 
and small open economies like Canada and Ireland (C.D. Howe, 2020), COVID-19 has changed the terms 
of the globalisation debate. 
This shift comes only a little over a decade after major disruption of trade and investment following 
the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Indications so far are that the effect of COVID-19 on global flows will 
be even more extensive both in trade (WTO, 2020c; CEC, 2020) and investment (UNCTAD, 2020). There 
are several reasons for this. Firstly, COVID-19 is both a demand and a supply shock whereas the trade 
collapse after the GFC was mainly driven by a shock in demand (Baldwin and Tomiura, 2020). As a 
result, global trade in both goods and services will be affected (WTO, 2020c). The crisis will generate 
spillover effects throughout supply chains, and highly trade-dependent countries are likely to be the 
most negatively affected (Fernandes, 2020; WTO, 2020d). Indeed, there is evidence that companies 
and sectors most heavily integrated into GVCs are particularly sensitive to trade shocks (Ferrantino 
and Taglioni, 2014; WTO, 2020c).  
Secondly, protectionist measures in response to COVID-19 are more widespread than those related to 
the GFC. Initially at least, the latter led to rather limited trade policy interventions, mainly affecting 
financial sectors, although protectionism has tended to steadily increase since the GFC (UNCTAD, 
2020). In addition, recent COVID-19 restrictions have taken a different form: direct bans on trade 
rather than measures that increase trade costs and often targeting exports as well as imports. These 
interventions risk increasing the fragility of the world trading system at a time when it is already under 
threat from increased recourse to ‘exceptional’ trade policy measures and US refusal to engage (Bown 
and Keynes, 2020). The intensifying US-China trade disputes have further weakened the confidence in 
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the world trading system. Finally, business uncertainty is extremely high, not only in relation to 
demand and supply, but also government willingness to intervene in economies, undermining investor 
confidence. This makes investment decisions even more challenging than in the post-GFC context 
(UNCTAD, 2020).  
All of these factors are likely to foster concern in MNEs about their reliance on GVCs going forward and 
reassess their own vulnerabilities and the robustness of their supply chains in this context (Strange, 
2020). It is critical for such strategic planning to have a clear understanding of the rules of the game 
they will face post-COVID, including whether and how international obligations stemming from existing 
trade agreements restrain governments’ trade policy responses to national health and security 
concerns. This paper seeks to inform this key question.  
An interdisciplinary literature review 
The questions which we pose in this paper are relevant to several different strands of existing academic 
enquiry. In this review of the literature we will highlight how these different research streams have 
explored the interaction between trade policy, its wider framing context, GVCs and international 
business. Although our empirical analysis mainly focuses on the concrete trade policy measures which 
have been mobilised in response to COVID-19, we believe that our findings speak to a literature which 
is far broader than international trade law. Most obviously, international business can only remain 
‘international’ in a context of relatively open and predictable trade policies. If many countries adopt 
policies which at best undermine and at worst openly challenge existing norms, it would represent a 
major shift in the institutional basis of international business operations, with unpredictable results.     
International Trade Law, Security and Health 
The first body of scholarship we engage with is the literature on international trade law. This literature 
has looked extensively at the question of which trade policy measures are legitimate in order to protect 
citizens. In negotiating the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), signed in 1947, it was 
anticipated that states may wish to intervene in trade to protect their populations both during times 
of war or in reaction to other threats. The result was Article XXI: the ‘Security’ Exceptions and Article 
XX: the General Exceptions, which provide specific instances in which WTO members can be exempted 
from GATT rules. For many years the General Exceptions were more widely utilized, and several 
comprehensive analyses have been undertaken by legal scholars (Barrett Lydgate, 2012; Bartels, 2015; 
Charnovitz 1997; Quick, 2013). One exception is particularly relevant to the protection of public health: 
paragraph XX (b). Pursuant to this paragraph, WTO members may adopt WTO incompatible policy 
measures if they are ‘necessary’ to protect human health.  
A variety of different trade restrictions have been judged to largely conform to GATT/WTO rules, 
including bans on imports of asbestos (Howse and Tuerk, 2001) and retreaded tyres (McGrady, 2009), 
as well as restrictions on the use of cigarette trademarks (Curran and Eckhardt, 2017). However, panels 
judging on Article XX defenses have clearly underlined the need for countries to demonstrate, both 
that such measures are ‘necessary’ to achieve the defined objective and non-discriminatory in their 
application. As is clear from several previous cases (Korea-Beef; Brazil- Retreaded Tyres; Thailand –
Cigarettes; EU-Seal Products), the “necessity” requirement in Article XX demands an enquiry into 
whether the policy objective could have been achieved through a less WTO-inconsistent measure 
(WTO, 2000; 2007; 2011; 2014). An overly broad measure, therefore, stands to be challenged under 
this requirement, even if it helps address the national problem identified. 
Likewise, examination of the nature of discrimination stemming from the measure in question is an 
important issue in an Article XX analysis. Two elements are examined in this regard. The first is whether 
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the measure discriminates between “countries where the same conditions prevail.” If the measure 
targets only a particular country or countries, when other non-targeted countries arguably pose a 
similar problem, it will likely fail to meet this requirement, which is interpreted to mean that 
discrimination is only permitted if it stems rationally from fulfilling the objectives of the measure (WTO, 
2014). The second element concerns whether the discrimination is ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable’. Even if 
a measure is directed at fulfilling the declared objective, it may still be problematic if the discrimination 
stemming from it is judged to be thus. As established in US-Shrimp and Brazil-Retreaded Tyres, 
judgement depends on the examination of the reasons and rationale for the discrimination provided 
by the state imposing the measure (WTO, 1998; WTO, 2007).  
Article XXI – the national security exception - has been described as a ‘pandora’s box’ (Boklan and 
Bahri, 2020) and an “all-embracing” exception to GATT rules, in that, in theory, each WTO member can 
self-define its ‘essential security interests’ (Bhala 1997). Nevertheless, countries have historically been 
cautious about using the article. Over the years it has occasionally been cited to justify trade 
restrictions or sanctions, with the US the most active user. However even they have only invoked it in 
limited circumstances: in 1985 against Nicaragua, as part of the War on Drugs and, in 1996 against 
Fidel Castro’s Cuba and Qadaffi’s Libya (Bhala, 1997). These actions were condemned by their major 
trading partners (Dattu and Boscariol, 1997), although, during the Falklands war, the European 
Community, Canada and Australia justified their suspension of imports from Argentina under Article 
XXI (Browne, 1997). In one of the most unlikely cases, Sweden tried (unsuccessfully) to invoke the 
Article in 1975, arguing that import quotas on shoes were necessary for national security reasons (Lee, 
2018).  
In recent years, however, we have seen a sudden increase in the number of disputed cases in the WTO 
involving national security (Lee, 2018; Pinchis-Paulsen, 2020; Yoo & Ahn, 2016). In addition to the 
above-mentioned US steel/aluminum case, there have been recent disputes between Russia and 
Ukraine; Japan and South Korea; India and Pakistan; as well as Qatar and several of its neighbors 
(Pinchis-Paulsen, 2020). Restrictions instigated in response to the COVID-19 crisis need to be seen in 
this context of increasing willingness to link trade policy to questions of security and attendant 
concerns about the extent to which such action is legal under WTO Agreements. 
Some clarification was provided from the first-ever WTO dispute examining the national security 
exception - a dispute between Ukraine and Russia in 2019 (Russia - Traffic in Transit). As regards 
whether a measure was “taken in time of emergency in international relations”, the WTO panel in this 
case opined that the action should be taken during the emergency (WTO, 2019). The panel’s discussion 
indicates that genuine COVID-19 countermeasures taken during the crisis are likely to meet this 
threshold. The panel also held that the national security exception is also premised upon the principle 
of good faith, which demands that states should not abuse the provision in order to circumvent existing 
treaty obligations (Op cit). Thus, the key criteria in judging COVID-19 related trade measures under 
Article XXI would likely be whether the measure in question is adopted in good faith during an 
emergency. 
Despite concerns about the expansion of the security ‘exception’ into trade policy (Evenett, 2020; C.D. 
Howe, 2020), there has been little systematic legal analysis of security related trade measures (Lee, 
2018; Pinchis-Paulsen, 2020; Yoo & Ahn, 2016) and no detailed research on the recent measures in 
response to COVID-19 (Pauwelyn, 2020). Such analysis is vital to understanding the extent to which 
trade restrictions during a public health (or other) emergency can be justified under existing WTO rules, 
both under Article XXI (Security Exceptions) and Article XX (General Exceptions). For business, such 
understanding is necessary to assess the predictability of the international trading system which 
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underpins their investment and sourcing choices going forward. This is the key issue which we seek to 
illuminate in this paper. 
The International Political Economy of the Global Trading System 
The concerns about compatibility with WTO rules, as discussed above, are of course only pertinent if 
the WTO continues to function as an institution for regulating disagreements on these rules between 
members. Yet the WTO has recently been undermined by the US’s refusal to nominate new Appellate 
Body members at the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which forced the Body to suspend its operation 
in December 2019 (Bown and Keynes, 2020). To shed light on these dynamics, it is helpful to look at 
another key area of literature, which is pertinent to the questions we address: international political 
economy (IPE). With some rare exceptions (Witt, 2019), IPE is rather rarely exploited within the 
international business literature. 
The relationship between trade openness, international institutions and security concerns has long 
been at the heart of debates in IPE. For instance, according to hegemonic stability theory 
(Kindleberger, 1973; Krasner, 1976), if there is a dominant power, the global economic system is most 
likely to be open and stable, while in the absence of a hegemon, instability and protectionism 
dominate. This literature holds that, as a result of free-rider problems, a single global hegemon needs 
to provide the public good of international stability and economic openness. Following WWII, this was 
indeed the role that the US played, as the driving force behind the creation of the multilateral trading 
system, with the GATT at its core. This system, although far from perfect and very politicised, was 
characterized by rules aimed at restricting arbitrary forms of discrimination and liberalizing global 
trade (Ikenberry 2019). In the course of the 1980s, the European Community (later the EU) was ready 
to provide joint leadership in the multilateral trade arena: during the Uruguay Round negotiations, the 
EU and US combined forces to create a global institution (the WTO) with a judicialized dispute 
settlement system as one of its key pillars (Eckhardt and Elsig 2015).  
Today the US is openly undermining the WTO and its dispute settlement system. Many observers even 
doubt whether the system will survive the current tensions, leading to the collapse of the rules-based 
WTO system and a return to a much more politicized GATT-style system (Bown and Keyes, 2020; 
Pauwelyn, 2019). They also fear that the COVID-19 crisis and the trade policy responses will make this 
outcome even more inevitable (Baldwin and Evenett, 2020; Bown, 2020). The implications of the 
weakening (and even potential disappearance) of the rules-based global trading system and the 
stability it provides for international business, have barely been discussed.  
There is also a clear security dimension to hegemonic stability theory, because the hegemon provides 
the public good of international stability as long as the distribution of gains does not compromise its 
national security. In the same vein, it has been argued that security motivations have been an 
important driver behind the negotiation of free trade agreements (FTAs), especially for the US. 
Beginning with its agreement with Israel in 1985, FTAs gained momentum as part of the post-9/11 US 
security agenda, with the US signing several agreements with countries that were of strategic or geo-
political importance. In the words of Robert Zoellick, the US trade representative at the time, such 
FTAs had to be earned via “cooperation…on foreign and security issues” (Capling and Ravenhill, 2012: 
292). Although, under Obama, the security rhetoric was less explicit, his administration openly linked 
the signing of trade agreements to foreign policy objectives, most obviously in relation to the TPP (op 
cit). Although some have argued that the EU is more of a “normative trade power” than the US (Poletti 
and Sicurelli, 2018), there is also evidence that EU’s trade policy is driven by geo-economic and geo-
political considerations (Zimmerman, 2007).   
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Linking trade policy to questions of national security, and the stability of the global trading system, are 
now being seen in a new light, both as a result of the evolution of US trade policy under the Trump 
administration and global responses to COVID-19 (Birrel Ivory, 2020; UNCTAD, 2020). Where Bush and 
Obama used free trade to further US security interests abroad, Trump is doing the exact opposite: 
using protectionism to defend national security. Accordingly, the administration considers that trade 
policy must be both in the national interest and coherent with security strategy (BDI, 2020). As part of 
this policy, as highlighted in the introduction, new tariffs on steel and aluminium have been imposed 
on imports, citing ‘security’ concerns and other products are threatened. This move has been highly 
controversial and contested and links the above debates within International Trade Law and IPE to 
existing scholarship in IB.  
The Interactions between Trade Policy and Global Value Chains  
One of the aims of this paper is to assess the implications of the COVID-19 related trade restrictions 
and the threat to the WTO for international business. To this end we draw on the literature on GVCs. 
Until relatively recently, the central focus of most of this literature was on governance patterns and 
power relations within GVCs (Gereffi et al., 2005; Ponte, 2019). Research often treated institutions and 
states as the external ‘context’ within which firms’ actions take place (Eckhardt and Poletti, 2018). 
However, in recent years we have seen a growing interest in, and recognition of, the pivotal role that 
states, and especially their trade policies, play in the structure and reach of GVCs (Curran 2015; 
Frederick et al. 2015; Horner 2017; Smith, 2015). Most of this literature starts from the assumption 
that trade policy measures typically lower trade barriers (at least for some partners) and, as such, much 
attention has been paid to how trade liberalization facilitates GVCs or favors more regional value 
chains (Frederick et al., 2015; Smith, 2015). However, as Curran et al. (2019: 875) observe, to assume 
that tariffs and other protectionist measures are no longer relevant ‘risks obscuring important parts of 
the picture…[particularly] in the context of the current anti-trade political rhetoric.’ Concretely, we have 
witnessed several years of increasing trade protectionism, which has raised major strategic challenges 
for companies (Curran and Eckhardt, 2020). A key question is how these shifts impact on GVCs.  
The COVID-19 crisis came just over a decade after another major shock to the global economy which 
had major impacts on GVCs and trade flows: the GFC of 2008-9. Analyses of the impacts of the 
attendant sudden slowdown of economic activity may provide some lessons for that following COVID-
19. Curran and Zignago (2011) found major impacts on trade, with sectors where the fragmentation of 
production was highly developed witnessing stronger effects from the crisis. Similarly, Ferrantino and 
Taglioni (2014) found that trade in complex products organized in GVCs was more sensitive to the 
global downturn than other trade. Others found, however, that overall GVCs have proven to be 
resilient in the aftermath of the GFC, noting consolidation of GVCs (Cattaneo et al. 2010) but also shifts 
in their structure with a growing salience of South-South trade post-GFC (Horner and Nadvi, 2018). 
Another key relevant research stream which, although primarily within international economics, 
overlaps to some extent with that on GVCs, is the literature on the impact of protectionism on trade. 
The COVID-19 measures came at a time when the world trading system was already under intense 
pressure. In recent years, developed countries have experienced a broad backlash against globalization 
in general and free trade in particular (Kobrin, 2017; Rodrik, 2018). For a variety of reasons, especially 
since the GFC, public opinion has become more skeptical of trade (Curran and Eckhardt, 2020; 
Mansfield and Mutz, 2013; Rodrik, 2018). Worryingly for international business, this backlash has led 
to major policy reversals which complicate the capacity of MNEs to operate across borders: the vote 
for Brexit in the UK, the US withdrawal from trade agreements such as TPP, its recent trade war with 
China and undermining of the WTO.  
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These policy changes have potentially major impacts on business strategy. While Brexit has been 
subject to extensive study (e.g. Gasiorek et al., 2019), the EU-UK trade relationship hasn’t actually 
changed yet. In contrast, the US-China trade war has already had major impacts, which underline the 
vulnerability of international business structures to policy change. Amiti et al. (2019) look at trends in 
US trade and import prices at detailed level and find that the new tariffs resulted in falls in import 
values of 25-30% and increases in prices of between 10-30%, as well as substantial reductions in variety 
in most affected sectors. These are averages and in some products tariffs were so prohibitive that trade 
fell to zero. They estimate that $165bn of trade was lost or redirected to avoid the tariffs. Similarly, 
Fajgelbaum et al. (2019) found falls in US trade volumes in affected sectors of 23% in imports and 25% 
in exports, while Handley et al. (2020) calculate that the decline in US exports was equivalent to a 2% 
tariff for a typical product and 4% for a product with high exposure.  
In depth sectoral analysis of the impact of new trade barriers can also be informative. Flaaen et al. 
(2020) explore US trade in washing machines, which were subject to various anti-dumping (AD) actions 
even before the introduction of the latest round of tariffs. Their work bears witness to the flexibility of 
business responses to new trade costs: when US imposed AD duties on washing machines from Korea 
and Mexico, firms shifted sourcing to China. When China was targeted, they shifted to Vietnam and 
Thailand and, finally, when all producers were targeted, firms moved production back to the US. Total 
imports were little affected by the duties until all producers were covered and prices even went down 
when production shifted to China. Curran (2015) found similar trade diversionary impacts from US AD 
duties on solar panels. These findings are coherent with the IB concept of the ‘Global Factory,’ where 
managers are orchestrators of dynamic production networks, constantly responding to external shocks 
(Buckley, 2009). Thus, the literature on protectionism underlies that it can have major impacts on trade 
and investment, while certain sectors are more vulnerable than others, not least because of variations 
in the geography, structure and flexibility of their value chains (Handley et al., 2020; Bellora and 
Fontagné, 2019). 
International Business Strategy, Institutional Change and Protectionism 
There are several streams of the international business literature which can shed light on company 
strategy in the current context. The discipline has long been interested in the interaction between 
institutions – both home and host – and MNEs (see Aguilera and Grogaard, 2019 for a recent review). 
However, the discipline has often struggled to take more than a ‘thin’ view of institutions and a 
tendency towards quantitative approaches may obscure qualitative changes in the institutional 
context (Aguilera and Grogaard, 2019). COVID-19 has resulted in a major expansion of the states’ role 
on the economy (UNCTAD, 2020). In the context of this paper, trade policy is one of the most visible 
institutional levers which governments have at their disposal to impact on MNE decision making. The 
extensive trade policy interventions following COVID-19 will certainly increase scrutiny of the 
interactions between state institutions and MNEs and will likely require a ‘thicker’ view of how 
institutions matter.  
Another key question for MNEs is how to react to the rising tide of trade protectionism, which 
threatens to undermine many of their business models. This question has attracted surprisingly little 
attention in the international business literature. The recent work which has appeared has mainly 
focused on the broader concept of ‘de-globalisation’, rather than trade protectionism (Butzbach et al., 
2020; Kobrin, 2017; Meyer, 2017; Moyo, 2019; Witt, 2019). This is surprising, as greater understanding 
of the implications of rising trade barriers for business strategy seems to us to be vital, if MNEs are to 
adapt their market and non-market strategies (NMS) to the new context (Baron, 1995). Although there 
is some limited work on MNEs in the trade policy arena, as Curran and Eckhardt (2020) point out, much 
of it focuses on how firms seek protection, rather than how they resist such pressures. In seeking to 
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shed light on the recent protectionist surge around COVID-19, we hope to contribute to greater 
understanding of the growing disruption in the global trading system and the strategic responses it 
requires of international business. 
Methodology 
In order to inform the question of the legality of trade responses to COVID-19, we undertake an 
empirical analysis of the measures taken by governments. We base our analysis on the COVID-related 
measures which were reported in the ITC’s database on the 10th May 2020.3 By this date, most of the 
countries which instituted such measures during the crisis, had done so. The ITC constituted the 
database from the WTO’s database,4 but also from government websites and press reports. They detail 
the type of measure, the products covered, the impact (restricting or liberalising) and the timeline of 
the measures. Although we briefly report on liberalising measures, we do not analyse them in detail 
as, in principle, such measures would be no threat to the WTO as, unless they are discriminatory, they 
are largely WTO compatible. We classified the interventions by nature (restrictions, bans, changes in 
non-tariff barriers), coverage (medical supplies, food, other) and whether they applied to exports or 
imports. Finally, we classified the 90 countries which instituted measures by World Bank category - 
High Income (HI), Upper Middle Income (UMI), Lower Middle Income (LMI) and Low-income countries 
(LIC). Least developed countries (most of which are also LICs) were also classified, as they have specific 
flexibilities under the WTO Agreements5. This was both for ease of presentation and because these 
different types of countries tend to have different roles within the key GVCs related to the pandemic, 
with most key medical devices produced in HI countries, while UMI (mainly China and Malaysia) are 
key sources for PPE (Gereffi, 2020). 
In order to better analyse the legal basis for these measures, we extracted all the official notifications 
provided to the WTO by the end of May. We noted quite some path dependency in such notifications, 
as members clearly built on others’ prior notifications in creating their own. Thus, for those which had 
not notified the WTO, we attributed the most likely justification building on those of members who 
notified similar measures. It is worth noting that several countries in our database were not WTO 
members, however all were at least ‘observers’ and therefore, in theory, seeking to conform to the 
rules in order to facilitate accession. We classified the measures by justification and by likelihood that 
the latter would be considered WTO compatible. Green measures were judged to be directly related 
to COVID-19 and appeared justifiable, in terms of protecting the population. Yellow measures were 
considered more problematic, for a variety of reasons discussed below. Clearly there is an element of 
educated judgement in our classifications. There is no way of knowing what a WTO panel (and the 
Appellate Body) might judge in a hypothetical dispute settlement proceeding, in the absence of more 
details of the measures at issue and their actual impact on markets. However, we are confident that 
our judgements are reasonable and objective under the circumstances and, importantly, that there 
are legitimate questions about the legality of many measures. 
Key Findings on COVID-19 Trade Measures and Their Impact 
The detailed analysis on which the findings we report here are based is too extensive to include in this 
short paper and can be found Table A1 and A2 in the on-line annex. Here we will simply highlight the 
 
3 The ITC maintained an updated database of measures throughout the pandemic available at the address: 
https://macmap.org/fr/covid19  
4 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/covid_measures_e.pdf 
5 LDCs have longer transition periods for implementing WTO agreements and can be given more generous 
market access than other countries, including other developing countries, under the ‘Enabling Clause’. 
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key findings from our work. On the question of the overall nature and coverage of the trade restrictive 
measures, our findings are reported in Table 1. As we can see, there are some slight differences in the 
nature of the measures taken by different types of countries. HI countries overwhelmingly restricted 
(or banned) exports of medical products (PPE, medicines). Restrictions on food and other products, as 
well as imports, were more common in UMI and LMI countries. Overall, the most common restrictions 
were on exports of medical products. LDCs were not very active in restricting medical trade and indeed 
pleaded for an end to such measures (WTO, 2020c). This is unsurprising, as they tend to 
overwhelmingly be import-dependent in the sector, especially in medicines. 
Table 1 - Restrictions on trade following COVID by nature and country type 
Medical Food Other Exports Imports Bans 
HI 27 1 1 28 1 21 
UMI 38 14 8 49 12 38 
LMI 16 9 1 23 3 20 
LDC 5 3 1 8 1 8 
LIC 5 4 1 10 1 7 
RG 2 1 0 3 0 2 
Total 93 32 12 121 18 96 
Source – Own calculations on the basis of ITC data 
An overview of the liberalising measures is provided in Table 2. HI countries undertook slightly fewer 
liberalising measures than restrictive. As these countries tend to have lower average tariff rates on 
medical goods, that is not surprising (WTO, 2020a). UMIs, LMIs and LDCs were very active in reducing 
tariffs on imports, especially for PPE and medicines. It is not without irony that many of these 
liberalising measures took place at the same time as producing countries imposed restrictions on 
exports that made it almost impossible to source such products on the global market. In several cases 
countries restricted exports of medical products, while simultaneously liberalising their import. There 
was some limited action to reduce non-tariff barriers (NTBs), like onerous certification procedures and 
eliminate previously imposed anti-dumping duties (ADDs) on imports, especially of medical goods. 
Table 2 - Liberalisation of trade following COVID by nature and country type 
Tariff Redn./  
Elimination 
NTB redn. Removal of 
ADDs or 
similar 
Medical Food All products 
HI 17 3 1 17 3 4 
UMI 38 4 4 39 4 0 
LMI 14 3 0 16 3 0 
LIC 2 0 0 1 0 1 
LDC 14 1 0 12 3 0 
RG 3 0 0 2 1 0 
Total 88 11 5 87 14 5 
Source – Own calculations on the basis of ITC data 
In relation to our second question on WTO compatibility, the liberalizing measures in Table 2 would 
not constitute violation of WTO Agreements, unless they were discriminatory, which never appeared 
to be the case. On the other hand, restricting measures in Table 1 would, almost by definition, 
constitute violation of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements. For instance, trade bans or 
restrictions are incompatible with Article XI:1 of the GATT, which prohibits quantitative restrictions on 
trade.  
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Import restrictions sometimes cited sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) concerns covered by the WTO’s 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement). However, 
that agreement requires any new trade measure to be compatible with various legal requirements 
(resembling those of Art XX in essence), and thus stipulates, most notably, risk assessments based on 
scientific evidence (Articles 2.2, 5.1) and non-arbitrary treatment of similarly situated states (Article 
2.3). SPS measures directed at particular countries, without offering risk assessments, may violate 
these provisions. On the other hand, when restrictions took the form of import licensing, they implicate 
the WTO’s Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures. Overly broad measures are likely contrary to 
its Article 3.2, which requires a measure to be tailored only to the extent necessary. Publication of 
insufficient information may also violate Article 3.3 of the agreement.  
That said, to the extent that these measures were introduced as countermeasures against COVID-19, 
these violations may be justified by the relevant exceptions in WTO Agreements. For instance, 
temporary export restrictions on essential products (such as medical equipment and medicines) are 
likely be justifiable under Article XI:2(a). Likewise, and most importantly, to the extent that these 
measures aim to protect human life or health, they can also be justified under Article XX(b) (Amaral 
and Kramer, 2019; Bartels, 2015). However, several countries restricted exports of food products, 
including fish (Cambodia) and vegetables (Egypt). Such restrictions may not satisfy the ‘necessity’ 
threshold and represent ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’ (Amaral and Kramer, 2019; Bartels, 
2015; Moran, 2016). If the measures are judged to be adopted ‘to protect essential security interests 
[in an] emergency of international relations’, they may nevertheless be justified under Article 
XXI(b)(iii). As discussed above, the exact scope and meaning of the national security exception are not 
entirely clear, but a plausible argument can be made that the COVID-19 outbreak constitutes an 
‘emergency of international relations’ (Boklan and Bahri, 2020; Prazeres, 2020; Heath, 2020; Lee, 
2018). Whether such a public health emergency can justify restrictions on exports or imports of 
products which are not directly related to managing that emergency, is an open question (Boklan and 
Bahri, 2020; Prazeres, 2020; Heath, 2020; Lee, 2018) and explains many of the ‘yellow’ classifications 
identified below. 
With respect to SPS measures, the SPS Agreement also carves out an important exception in Article 
5.7, which incorporates the precautionary principle and allows WTO members to adopt import 
restrictions without conducting a scientific risk assessment in ‘an emergency situation’ (Scott, 2009). 
However, members adopting restrictive measures under this Article must continuously assess the 
situation and conduct risk assessments (op.cit). Viewed from this perspective, import bans on Chinese 
agricultural products (Egypt and Kazakhstan) may be difficult to justify. Given that COVID-19 is thought 
to have passed to humans from wild animals (Xie and Chen, 2020), import bans on such animals (China) 
and all live animals from China (Georgia) may potentially be more justifiable. Although bans which only 
target certain Chinese agricultural imports, as imposed by Egypt, Jordan, Kazakhstan, may fall foul of 
the non-discrimination requirement, especially as other countries were subsequently hit harder by 
COVID-19 than China. 
Several measures to restrict imports have no clear link, either to SPS measures, or to managing the 
emergency. For example, Fiji increased the tariffs on petrol imports, while Kazakhstan restricted 
imports of cement, Botswana banned imports of tobacco products and Sri Lanka all non-essential 
goods. With the facts at our disposal, these restrictions do not seem likely to pass the ‘necessity’ test 
under current WTO jurisprudence. One of the most surprising measures was an import ban on face 
masks by Bahamas (the only HI country to institute a measure classified as ‘yellow’). The Prime Minister 
is quoted as saying that “The move is an effort to protect the local mask manufacturing industry that 
has sprung up overnight as a result of the COVID-19 virus.” (The Tribune, 2020). Similarly, some 
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interventions seem to represent an opportunistic attempt to reinstate previously controversial trade 
measures: both Kenya and Uganda banned imports of used clothing. Although Uganda reversed the 
decision almost immediately, Kenya’s had no end date. Trade in used clothing has long been a sensitive 
issue and previous bans in both countries were only overturned after threats from the US to remove 
their market access (Brady and Lu, 2018). 
As a full picture of many measures is not yet available and specific implementation of these measures 
is still amorphous, it is hard to fully affirm their violation or justification at this stage. In addition, many 
of the most problematic measures were not notified to the WTO. We could therefore only surmise 
their justification from press reports or government statements. That said, most measures seem in 
principle to satisfy the requirements of the various exceptions. On the other hand, a substantial 
number, such as those highlighted above, do not appear to be directly related to the urgent demands 
of the health crisis, while some seem to primarily seek to protect domestic industries. 
Table 3 provides an overview of our findings on the extent to which the measures were considered to 
be justified, as well as whether they were not notified to the WTO, which could itself carry legal 
implications and whether they had an expiration date, which would tend to support the argument that 
they are a temporary response to COVID-19. Clearly such temporary measures, such as the EU’s 
licencing scheme for exports of key medical supplies, are easier to justify under the necessity test. It is 
evident from the table that most of the measures considered to be of dubious legality were taken by 
UMI countries, whose measures also most often had no expiration date. Although only one HI country 
took measures which were categorised as yellow, many HI measures were not notified to the WTO. 
Table 3 - Categorisation of measures and WTO notifications 
  Green Yellow 
Not notified to 
WTO No expiration date 
No of measures 102 38 118 82 
HI 29 1 26 16 
UMI 41 20 50 35 
LMI 18 6 21 17 
LIC 7 4 9 6 
LDC 6 5 10 8 
RG 1 2 2 0 
Source – Own calculations on the basis of ITC data. 
Finally, in relation to our third question on whether these COVID-19 interventions represent a shift in 
the rules of international trade and what their wider implications might be, it is clear from our analysis 
that the crisis has led to widespread and intense instigation of potentially WTO incompatible measures 
over a very short period. This is unprecedented in post-war history. It undoubtedly further undermines 
the legitimacy and moral authority of the WTO. As highlighted above, this comes at a time when the 
institution already faces major challenges as a result of US (non) action vis-à-vis the WTO (Bown and 
Keynes, 2020). This could be construed, within hegemonic stability theory, as the US, a declining 
hegemon, failing to defend the public goods which it helped to create and consequently destabilizing 
the multilateral system developed under its leadership (see also Stokes 2018). A weak WTO risks 
creating a situation where governments feel less constrained by the previously held tacit agreement 
that ‘exceptions’ like security and public health should only be used in truly exceptional circumstances, 
for a limited period. This situation seems to have occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic, creating a 
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clear risk that ‘creative’ use of the flexibility of WTO rules will increase, especially if the US continues 
to actively undermine the WTO.  
In terms of the impact of these shifts on international business, it is difficult not to conclude that the 
recourse to such measures calls into question the extent to which MNEs can consider trade policy to 
be a relatively stable given in their decision making. The short-term falls in trade which inevitably 
follow every global crisis may recede, but the long-term impacts will depend on the policy response. 
COVID-19 has resulted in a rapid shift in the willingness of governments across the world to intervene 
in markets, including in goods only tangentially linked to the pandemic. These interventions, coming 
on top of increasing protectionism before the pandemic, mean that MNEs will need to pay increasing 
attention to the trade policy environment and its evolution when taking strategic decisions on trade 
and investment (UNCTAD, 2020). 
There has been much concern about the long-term impact of the pandemic on GVCs. Although it is 
clearly too early to reach firm conclusions on how GVCs will be reshaped, there is little doubt that shifts 
are likely in response to COVID. A recent UNCTAD report concluded: ‘The decade to 2030 is likely to 
prove a decade of transformation for international production.’ (UNCTAD, 2020: XII). The variations 
across governance and structure of GVCs suggest that the impact will vary by sector and thus by 
country (Gereffi et al, 2005; UNCTAD, 2020). While the fragilities in certain GVCs which COVID has 
exposed will, in any case, push companies to reassess their supply chains and diversify their sourcing 
(Strange, 2020), the widespread policy interventions analysed here and the uncertainly which they 
foster, will also impact on decision-making. The current crisis will further strengthen the growing 
recognition of the importance of trade policy (Curran et al, 2019) and the role of the state in framing 
GVCs and the ‘Global’ Factory more generally (Horner, 2017). It will also likely expand the coverage 
and understanding of ‘strategic’ industries. As Curran (2015) pointed out, these industries are 
particularly vulnerable to trade policy interventions.   
Conclusions, research limitations and future directions. 
In this short paper we sought to shed light on the likely long-term impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic 
on international business through an exploration of the extent to which trade policy interventions in 
response to the pandemic were compatible with WTO law. We find that, although the majority of 
measures are probably justifiable, there were nevertheless many whose coverage or nature was such 
that a justification under Articles XX or XXI is, at the very least, questionable. The banning of exports is 
an extreme measure which is relatively rare in the global trading system. Yet we saw widespread 
recourse to such action during the crisis, sometimes with no published end date. At the very least, 
temporary trade measures taken in times of crisis need to have a built-in expiration clause. Otherwise 
they risk persisting long after they have outlived their necessity (ECIPE, 2020).  
The increasing policy interventions during the pandemic add to pre-existing trade tensions and change 
the policy context that has underpinned the growth of globalisation in recent decades. Whether the 
result is de-globalisation, or a restructuring of existing GVCs, is a key question for the future of 
international business (Strange, 2020). Observers have suggested that firms will repatriate supply 
chains (UNCTAD, 2020), retrench into more regionally focused supply chains (UNCTAD, 2020; Javorick, 
2020), as well as increasing diversification and replication, potentially increasing inefficiencies 
(UNCTAD, 2020; Javorick, 2020). For the moment this is largely educated opinion. Much more detailed 
work will be required to establish exactly how MNEs market and non-market strategies adapt to the 
new more uncertain and unconstrained context.  
The pandemic was still ongoing at time of writing and policy interventions are also shifting. The 
announcement in June 2020 that the US had bought up the entire supply of a promising treatment 
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represented a new escalation. Such interventions could mean that other countries face the choice of 
foregoing novel treatments, or issuing compulsory licences, which could undermine another WTO 
agreement - the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (Boseley, 2020). 
It is therefore still too early to provide robust judgements on the persistent impacts of COVID-19 on 
international business. This is one of the main limitations of our work. The true effects on MNEs and 
GVCs can only be accurately judged over time. What is clear is that the international policy 
environment has further shifted towards a more uncertain and protectionist context, where 
international trade agreements are less constraining on domestic action. This changes the institutional 
context in which MNEs evolve. Integrating this qualitative shift will require a ‘thick’ view of global 
institutions and their reach (Aguilera and Grogaard, 2019). Specifically, in the trade policy context, 
targeted actions to protect ‘strategic’ industries and supplies may have relatively minor impacts on 
commonly used indicators of trade openness, like average tariffs, yet have major impacts on the 
targeted sectors. Accurately assessing national institutional contexts may therefore require a more 
sector-specific approach.  
Another key limitation of our study is that, given the lack of jurisprudence on such interventions, our 
judgements on legality are, by definition, educated guesses. However, it is clear from our analysis that 
there are several legitimate questions about many of these measures which justify serious concern 
about their implications for the robustness of the international trading system. There is no way of 
knowing whether any of these measures will be subject to a WTO panel. In general, formal complaints 
are only launched when a trade measure undermines the core interests of a trading partner, or more 
precisely, those of companies operating within its jurisdiction (Curran and Eckhardt, 2017). Thus, for a 
challenge to happen, a member would need to consider that one of the more WTO-compatible 
measures highlighted here jeopardised one of their key industries. However, even in the absence of a 
formal dispute, the WTO emerges from the pandemic further fragilized, with its capacity to enforce 
global rules weakened. This is happening at the very time when the last member of the WTO Appellate 
Body has completed her term, leaving the institution with no appeal system and undoubtedly facing a 
major reform process which may take years (Graham, 2020). It will be important for the academic 
community, in international law, IB and IPE, to remain vigilant in monitoring and analysing 
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